Chelyabinsk-65 did not receive foreign visitors, and was not on maps of the Soviet Union until 1989. Prior to about 1990, it was called Cbelyabinsk-40. It is located in the area around Lake Kyzyltash, in the upper Techa River drainage basin among numerous other lakes with interconnecting watercourses. Chelyabinsk-65 is run by the production association Mayak (translated "Lighthouse" or "Beacon"), and the defense enterprise is referred to as the Mayak Chemical Combine. Between Lake KyzyUash and Lake Irtyash, about 10 km from the reactor area,.is Ozersk, the closed militaryindustrial city built to house the Chelyabinsk-65 workforce, and whose population is 83,.soO (1).
Apparently fashioned after the US Hanford Reservation, Chelyabinsk-65 was the Soviet Union's first plutonium production complex. Construction was started on the first buildings of the new city in November 1945, and in June 1948 the first production reactor was brought on line (2): Some 70,000 inmates of 12 labor camps were reportedly used to construct the complex (3) . 2 Today the site occupies an area on the order of 200 km 2 (4). In 1989, a US delegation was told that there were some 10,000 employees and 40,000 dependents at Chelyabinsk-65.
The combine produced plutonium for nuclear weapons from 1948 until November I, 1990. Chelyabinsk-65 now produces special isotopes, and reprocesses naval and civil power reactor fuel for plutonium and uranium recovery. 1be combine also produced special (read "military") instruments (5) ; in recent years it has begun to produce a variety of equipment for .~'-'-_._~_._' ....
-.. "civilian~se (6).
The known facilities at Chelyabinsk-65 are listed in Table 1 . There are five graphite-moderated water-cooled production reactors and two light water~ooled and -moderated production reactors, one of which was a heavy water-moderated production reactor before being rebuilt in the latc 19808. The graphite reactors, which had a combined capacity of 6565 megawatts thennal (MWt), were used for phltonium ptodu",tior:~don .. being shut down. The two light water reactors, each with a capacity of about 1000 MWt, are used for the production of tritium and other isotopes.The Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile peaked in 1986, and has since declined by more, than 20%. Consequently, tritium production may 
Years
. A radiation survey, taken in the summer of 1951, revealed extensive contamination of the floodplain and bed of the Techa River and excessive exposure to the inhabitants of the region. The greatest exposure was to the 1200 inhabitants of the village of MetJino, 7 km downstream from the release point. There, the gamma dose on the river bank was 5 roentgen/hour (RIb) in spots, 3.5 Rlh at household patches near the river in the village, and 10-15 microroentgenlhour (IJ.RJh)on roads and streets (l1), (Many cities in the world have natural background level OD the order of 10-20 IJ.RJh.) A new solution was adopted in September 1951. Instead of discharging the radioactive waste into the Techa River', the wastes were diverted into Karachay Lake (see below), and a series of artificial reservoirs was created along the Techa to retain most of the activity already discharged.
Some 124,000 people along the Te<:ha-lset'-Tobol River system were exposed to elevated.levels of radiation, none having been warned about the danger (12). Ninety-nine percent of the radioactivity that was dumped into the Techa was deposited within the first 35 kil9meters downstream ( Figure  2 ). In 1949 there were 38 villages with 28,000 people along the Techa riverside 237 km downstream from the plant in Chelyabinsk and' Kurgan oblasts (13, 14) . For many of the 28,000, the river was the main source of drinking watcr.
7 From 1953 to 1960, 7500 people in the upper reaches.
of the Techa were relocated. 8 The water supply of other residents remaining along the Techa in 1956, including 4950 residents who would be resettled by 1961, was shifted to underground sources, and the radioactive floodplaw as fenced off (18) . The Techa River and 8000 hectares (ha)9 of its floodlands were excluded from use for economic and drinking purposes, although this ban has not been strictly observed over the .years ..
An epidemiological study of the 28,100 exposed individuals who received substantial external and internal radiation doses found that a statistically significant increase in leukemia morbidity and mortality arose between 5 and 20 years after the initial exposure (19) . 10 A search was made for other cancers, but the small increase in those is barely significant and unconvincing. The greatest exposure, e.
•.• 1imated to average 140 rem effective dose equivalent, was received by the 1200 inhabitants of the town of MetHoo, 7 km downstream from the release point ( A cascade of four reservoirs (Nos. 3, 4, 10, and II, sh<!~.I! .. Figure  3) were created along the Techa just below Lake Kyzyltash (reservoir No.
'''The situation on the river Techa banks was also complicated because for the Ioca1 population the river had been a major and even the only source of drinking and washing water. The wells were few, they were used by pan of the population. not for all purpos.es since the well water here was by far of a more inferior quality in taste than the river water. Moreover, the river had been used for drinking by cattle, growing fowl. and watering vegetable gardens, fishing. bathing. washing. etc" (15 into bottom deposits of the lower section of the river down to to 78 km from the discharge spot. In subsequent years the radioactively contaminated bottom deposits have become a powerful source of secondary contamination .. of the river water" (27).
The average annual concentrations of Sr-90 and Cs-137 in the Techa at the Muslyumovo settlement 78 km downstream from the reserVoirs is shown in Table 4 . The Asanovski marshes (or swamps), an area of 30 km 2 through which the Techa flows just below the last reservoir (NQ. 11), contain some . 6000 Ci of 5r-90 and Cs-137 (29). There seems to be no data on how much radioactivity is transported from the marshes into the Techa.
Lake Karachay (Reservoir 9)
As noted above, in September 1951, the Soviets stopped discharging the diluted high-level wastes directly into the Techa, and instead diverted it into Lake Karachay-at the time, a natural 4S-ha (llO-acre), 2-3 m deep lake with no surface outlet (30). The intennediate waste storage facility (discussed below) apparently was not put into operation until 1953. Consequently, this practice may have continued for more than a year ..
Since 1953, the Soviets have continued to discharge medium-level waste into Lake Karachay. In comparing the concentrations of cesium (Cs) and strontium (Sr) in the lake and the intermediate waste storage tanks, it appears that the precipitated sludge, which included most of the Sr, was retained Reservoir number 4; .S. Soulb Urals Prlljeel (Con.~lruction of 3 aN·BOO reactors); 6. Lake number 6; 7. Chelyahinsk.65 reactor area; 8. Ourst (Chelyablnsk-65 residential area); 9. Lake Karachry.; 10. Rescrvoirnumbcr 10; 1J. Rescrvoirnumber 11; 12. Tccha River; 13. Kyshtymj 14. Lake Bot'shaya Alrulva; IS. Lake Akakul'; 16. Lake Ulagach; 17. Lake Staroe Boloto (Old Swamp). Photoeopyright Cl SplICe Media NctworklCNES SPOT Satellite Image. • Source: (28) in the waste· tanks. and the excess supernatant, which contained much of the Cs, was discharged into the Jake. This is apparently still the practice, in that today medium-level waste (800;OO(Y Ci In 1992) is still being added to maintain the water level of the lake (31). Though 1990, the lake had accumulated 120 MCi of the long-lived radionuclides Cs-l3? (98 MCi) and Sr-9O (20 MCi) (26). In comparison, 2.4 MCi of Cs-137 and 0.22 MCi of Sr-90 were released from the Cbemobyl accident (32). The lake in 1990 had a surface radiation exposure level of 3-4 radlh (30). When a visiting delegation went within "a few hundred feet of the water, the radiation reading in the bus reached 80 millirems per hour .(mremlh) (30). A second delegation received 300-600 mremlh at a point about 10-12 m from the edge of the lake (33). On the lake shore in winter the radiation dose is about 20 rerns per hour (remlh), and summer about 18 remlh (34). In the region near where !he radioactive e.f!l11~n.t is discharged into the lake, where the specific activity of the ground deposits is up to 20 CiJkg (dry weight; 2-3 Cill wet) (35), the.radiation exposure rate is about 600 roentgens per hour (Rlh), sufficient to provide a lethal dose within an hour (26); 11 In 1967. a hot sUn1merfollowed a dry winter. The water evaporated and dust from the lake bed was blown over a vast area, up to 75 km long, affecting 41,000 people (37). Some 600 Ci of Cs-137 and Sr-90 from the. shores of Lake Karachay contaminated about 1800-2700 km 2 at a level"
liThe radiatiOll do8e 81 which balf the population would be expected to die (LD5Q) depends on a number of factors, including type of exposure, whelher whole body or specific organ, the length of time of the exposure, the medical attention received after the exposure, etc. For whole body (or bone mllIrOw) exposure, estimates of LD5Q range from 250 to 650 rem; see (36ab).
greater than 0.1 Ci/km2 (8r-OO),including the reactor site and 41.500 people in 63 villages, some of which were under the radioactive plume from the 1957 nuclear waste tanlc accident (discussed beIOW).12 The reactor site was contaminated with Cs-137 and Sr-90 in the ratio of 3:1 with 5r-OOcontamination up to 10 Ci/km2 (26). As a result of more than 40 years of dumping into Lake Karachay, radioactivity has seeped into the groundwater and migrated 2.5-3~m from the lake. The groundwater flows toward reservoirs 2 and 3 (the Tecba) in the north and northeast direction. and to the south it drains toward the Mishelyak River, a tributary of the Techa (39). Radioactive groundwater has reached the Mishelyak, flowing under the river bed at a depth of 15 m (40). The total volume of contaminaled groundwater is estimated to be more than 4 million m J ,. containing in excess of 5000 Ci of -30-year half-life fission products (39).
Efforts to eliminate the reservoir began in 1967. The lake. is now. slowly being filled to reduce the dispersion of radioactivity. Hollow concrete blocks, one meter on a side with one side open, are first placed in the lake, .then rock and soil are placed on top. The blocks keep the sediment from being· pushed up to the surface. The three-point program IS to: 1. fill in the lake, 2. cover the lake, and 3. pump and treat the water (30). As of mid-Qctober 1991, about 5000 blocks had been placed into the lake. In June 1990, it was reported that the area of the lake had shrunk to 25 ha (62 acres) and its volume to 400,000 m J • 13 In October 1991 it was reported that the lake had been reduced in size to about 20 ha, down from its original size of 45 ha (33). The plan is to completely fill the reservoir by 1995.
Lake Staroe Boloto (Old Swamp; Reservoir 17)
Built in 1949 by.."erectingan ea.'i:he~dam, this 17-ha (42-Qcr~) drainlc;iis lake located 5 km northeast of Lake Karachay has a volume of 35,000 m 3 and has been used as a storage reservoir for medium-level waste, including tritium condensate, since 1971 (41, 4). By 1990, it had accumulated about 2 MCi of radioactivity, mainly in bottom sediments (41. 4). Medium-level waste continues to be added to Staroe Boloto today (42). The bottom of . Lake Staroe 8010to absorbs most of the radionuclides more readily than does the bottom of Karachay. Consequently, the contaminated halo is considerably smaller (43). 
Waste Explosion in 1957
The so-called "Kyshtym Disaster" was the subject of considerable analysis and speculation in the West prior to 1989. when Soviet officials revealed details of the accident. 14 During the initial period of operation of the chemical separation plant, irradiated fuel elements were treated by an "all-acetate precipitation scheme," (52)1.5 resulting in high-level radioactive waste solutions containing as much as 100 grams per liter (g/l) of sodium nitrate and 80 g/I of sodium acetate (53) . The solution was stored for a year in tanks (presumably at what is referred to below as the intermediate storage facility) in order to reduce the radioactivity and cool prior to further treatment for additional extraction of plutonium and uranium (53) . After treatment, a portion of the solutions was returned to the storage tanks and the less active part was dumped into Lake Karachay (53) .
The intennediate storage facility was put into operation in 1953 (53) . It consisted of a rectangular buried stainless steel-clad concrete canyon with walls 1.5 ·m thick, designed for installation of 20 stainless steel tanks at a depth of 8.2 m (53), 16 Called "permanent storage containers," each tank was 300 cubic meters (m 3 ) (80,000 gallons US) in volume (56) . The tanks, entirely immersed in water, utilized an external cooling system with water flowing through an annular gap between the tank walls and the trench (52). Some of the instruments for monitoring the tanks failed and could not be repaired due to the high radiation field in the canyon (52). As the solution in the tanks evaporated, the tanks gradually rose. breaking the seals in the waste transfer lines and contaminating the cooling water, The cooling water was treated in the same part of the plant used to process the waste. Because of insufficient production capacity, the tanks were switched to a "periodic cooling mode" (52). The cooling system in one of the unmonitored tanks faned. however, and the waste began to drj out. Nitrates and acetates in the waste precipitated, heated up to 35(tC (660 ISTIte technology for chemically separating the plUlonium from radioactive fission products changed several times over the 4o-year history of !he chemical separation plant.
16Ref. 54 says Kone.of 16 steel tanks K exploded, ralber than one of 20. Donald Wodrich, a member of the DOE delegation that traveled to ChelyabiDsk-40 in June 1990, reported 16 tanks (55) to the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety on Oclober 31, 1990. radioactivity were ejected (53).11 By comparison, an estimated 51.4 MCi of fission products (excluding noble gases), was released in the Chernobyl accident (60) .
About 90% of the radioactivity from the ejected waste fell out in thẽ mmediate vicinity of the vessel. The remaining activity, approximately 2.1 MCi. formed a kilometer-high radioactive cloud that was carried through Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk, and Tumensk Oblasts, reaching the neighborhood of Kamensk-Uralskiy after 4 hours, and Tyuman after II hours (53, 56. 60-(3). Some 23,000 km Ref. 69 reports 1500 inhabitants in the area and 1100 inhabitants evacuated in 7-10 days. Despite the high radiation doses received, no excess late effects (e.g. cancers) were detected in a follow-up study of the residents ofthese three villages, due to the small size of the population (1059 persons), limited period of observation, and lack of a good control population (70) . The next wave of evacuations began about eight months after the accident, involving 6500 people. These people consumed contaminated foods for three to six months without restriction and continued to consume Some contaminated food until their evacuation. In all, inhabitants of 23 villages (56), about 10,700 people, were evacuated from areas having contamination levels greater than 2 Cilkm 2 (Sr-90) (56) . As of 1990, no registry had been initiated to follow the medical histories of the exposed population in all 217 towns and villages within the trace (71) .
The population ate the 1957 harvest, which was contaminated with radionuclidc<s (12). By 1959, all areas contaminated in excess of 2 Cilkm Since 1949, Mayak has discharged in excess of 123 MCi of long-lived radionuclides (Sr-9O and Cs-135) into the environment, contaminating in excess of 26.700 km 2 , and exposing more than 400.000 people, making the Chelyabinsk-6S environs arguably the most polluted spot on the planetc ertainly in tenns of radioactivity. Parts of the Che1yabinsk-65 site have a dose rate of up to 15 mRIh. The average value for the remainder of the site is in the range of 10 to 30~h.
(As noted previously. many cities in the world have natural background levels on the order of 20 •.
•. RJh.) Open reservoirs on site contain 340 million rr? of radioactive water. Fish in Reservoir No. 10 are reported to be "100 times more radioactive than normal" (74) . The Techa River is cordoned off with a wire fence, and people are forbidden to catch fish, pick mushrooms or berries, or cut the hay, but there are many stories of farmers cutting fences so that their livestock can reach the river. The children of Muslyumovo, a village 78 km downstream that was not evacuated, were reported in 1991 to be receiving an effective dose equivalent of 0.5-1.0 remly (75) .
The production complex, by consuming contaminated water for its needs, regulates the water level in the reservoirs along the Techa River. With all but one of the reactors shut down, a new potential danger has been idenlificd-·-overfilling the reservoirs with natural water and possibly even failure of the dams, sending contaminated water into the rivers of the Db basin. The South Urals nuclear power station. begun in 1984 and intended to consist of three liquid mctal fast breeder reactors, was to avert this sort of catastrophe by using radioactive water to cool turbine condensers, thus increasing evaporation (76) . But, construction of the project was halted in 1987 due to public protests following from the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Serious economic and safety concerns about the breeder progrctmraise doubts as to whether it will ever be completed.
Storage in High-Level Waste Tanks
The current procedure for handling high-level waste involves fllSt evapora-" tion and then fixation in sparingly soluble compounds, i.e. hydroxide and ferrocyanide compounds. The concentrated wastes are Slored in instrumented single-shell stainless steel storage -tanks housed in metal-lined reinforced concrete canyons. It was reported in 1991 that at least 976 MCi of radioactive waste is kept in storage in solutions.
Waste Vitrification
In the mid-1950s, the Soviets began to develop techniques for transforming liquid radioactive wastes into solids with radionuclide fixation in stable matrixes suitable for long-term safe storage. Preference was given to vitrification (Le. preparation of glass-like materials), and development proceeded in two directions: (a) two-stage vitrification with waste calcination at the first stage; and (b) a large development effort, the so-called single-stage method of preparing phosphate and borosilicate glass-like materials in a ceramic meIter without preliminary calcination.
The CheJyabinsk-65 vitrification program began in 1967 and is still in use. In May 1992, it was reported that 60 MCi of high-level waste had been vitrified. The production capacity of the plant is now 1 lid. Originally, the concentration of radioactivity was 100 Ci/l (SO Cilkg); currently 400 eM is achieved. The current backlog of high-level waste amounts to about 10 years work for the vitrification plant.
Solid Waste Buriai 20
There are 227 solid waste burial sites (about 10% were still receiving waste in (990) with a total area of about 30 ha, with the burials themselves occupying 21.3 ha (Table 5 ) (77-79). The site contained in 1990 some 525,000 t of waste containing 12 MCi of activity (81) . The burial sites for low-level and medium-level solid radioactive waste are trenches dug in the soil. After being filled, the trenches are covered with clay to reduce the intrusion of water. Burial sites usually are located where the water table is greater than four meters below the bottom of the burial. The bottom and the walls are lined with a layer of clay for further hydraulic isolation. Radionuclides can migrate from burial sites due to infiltrating atmospheric precipitation while filling the burial before the waste is covered, and can also migrate in the. water-bearing horizon, and by diffusion in moist soil.
High-level solid radioactive wastes are placed in reinforced concrete structures with multiple waterproofing-with bitumen, stainles.~steel, concrete. The clay soil coating the bottom and the walls of the container prevent radionuclide migration. Only these high-level radioactive waste structures are equipped with instrumentation and a signalling system. The trench-like burials have no instrumentation.
Nearly all solid production wastes are dumped without being processed, due to the lack of well-developed installations for burning, compaction, deacti"vation, and melting. The large number of burial sites is explained by the fact that every plant had originally, and still has, its own burial sites Soun:e: (80) for each kind of waste. The dumping waS organized so as to minimize the distance between the sites of production and of burial of solid waste.
As a consequence of poor waste management practices at Chelyabinsk-65, primarily during the frrst two decades of operations. the site and its surroundings were extensively contaminated, and thousands of people were unknowingly exposed to excessive levels of radiation. In tenns of human health consequences, most of the damage has already been inflicted. Nevertheless, containment of the residual radioactivity in high-level waste tanks, in the reservoirs along the Techa River, and in and below Lake Karachay represents expensive challenges for which the best, or even adequate solutions. have yet to be devised. Russian scientists have the knowledge to address these problems, but lack practical experience with contemporary waste management practices. Western expenise could be helpful in quantifying the extent of the problems and devising solutions. However, the real challenge will be to mobilize the economic resources for effective cleanup at Chelyabinsk-65 in light of all the other economic and environmental problems Russia faces.
We have chosen to express the quantity of radioactivity and radiation dose in tenns of older units, since most of the source documents used these units. The unit for the amount of radioactivity, measured in tenns of the rate of radioactive decay, is the curie (Ci), where I Ci = the quantity of any radionuclide, or radionuclides, that undergoes 3.7 X. 10 10 disiI)tegrations per second. Historically, this unit was chosen because it was the activity of one gram of radium-226. Under the modem International System of Units (Sl), the becquerel (Bq) is defined as one disintegration per f:econd. Therefore, 1 Ci = 3.7 x 10 10 Bq. Radionuclides can be characterized, not only by the rate of disintegration, but by the types of radiation emitted-alpha-, beta-, gamma-and/or Xrays-and the energy of each quanta or particle emitted. One of the early units of radiation was the roentgen (R), which was defined in terms of the quantity of X-or gamma-radiation that produced the same number of ion pairs in one cubic centimeter of dry air that would be produced by one gram of radium at a specified distance.
Since the roentgen is limited to X-and gamma-radiation in air, another unit is needed to specify the amount of energy absorbed in matter of any type. One such lUlit of absorbed dose is the rad, which corresponds to the absorption of 100 ergs of ionizing radiation in one gram of any material at the place of interest. The modem 51 counterpart is the gray (Gy), and the relationship is I rad = 0.01 Oy = I cGy (centi-gray).
Since the absorption of one rad of ionizing radiation in tissue can cause different biological effects, depending on the type and energy of the radiation, another unit is needed to measure the equivalent biological damage. One such unit of dose equivalent is the rem, where one rem is the amount of ionizing radiation of any type that produces the same damage in human tissue as one rad of X-radiation at a defined energy. The modern Sl unit is the sievert (Sv), and the relationship is I rem = 0.01 Sv = I cSv.
If, as often assumed for absorbed doses below a few hundred rem, the risk of a particular type of biological damage, e.g. cancer, is proportional to the dose, then it is useful to define collective dose as the sum of the individual doses, e.g. 100 person-rem = 10 rem to 10 persons = 1 rem to 100 persons,. etc. The estimated number of cancers induced is then the product of collective dose and a cancer risk factor determined from epide-..·miological studies. We assume for the general population, one cancer fatality per 1000 person-rem. It should be recognized, however, that the cancer risk factor is a function of the type of cancer, sex and age distribution of the population, and other variables, and it has been a matter of ex.tensive research and great debate. For the types of radiation discussed in this report, .. namely, the beta-and gamma-radiation from Sr-90, Cs-137, and most other fission products (everything except alpha-radiation from uranium, plutonium, and the like), .1 r •••• I rad = I cGy ;0>0 I rem = 1 cSv. In other words, in this report these dose units are, for all practical purposes, interchangeable. 
